Gaugamela draft

1. Summary card

2. Leaders

3. Forces

4. Strategic context

• Macedon's aim. After Issus, Alexander took the coast of the Levant and Egypt, cutting the Persian fleet off from its bases. He then turned inland to finish the empire by destroying its army and capturing Darius.
• Persia's aim. Darius had two years to raise a new army from the eastern provinces, which were rich in cavalry. He needed one decisive victory on open ground of his own choosing, where his numbers and cavalry would count.
• Why here. Darius chose the flat plain near Gaugamela and had it levelled for his chariots (Arrian 3.8.7; Curtius 4.9.10). Alexander crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus and the Tigris, then rested his army four days before advancing to the ridge overlooking the Persian army (Arrian 3.9.1–4). The Persians stood to arms all night fearing a night attack, so they began the battle tired (Arrian 3.11.1).

5. Terrain and weather

• Ground. A broad, open plain between low hills and the Bumodus (Khazir) River. The Persians had cleared and levelled a strip in front of their line so that the chariots could charge at full speed.
• Weather. Early autumn: dry and warm. The battle was fought in daylight after the Persians had spent the night under arms.
• How terrain shaped the battle. The open plain favoured Darius's cavalry and chariots. Alexander's answer was to march across it at an angle, moving right towards rougher ground. That forced Darius either to let him leave the levelled strip or to send cavalry out to stop him, stretching the Persian line.

6. Maps

Maps follow the house style: tan landscape, troop blocks in each side's colour (Macedon navy, Persia red), pictorial troop figures, dashed arrows for movement, a key and a title box. North is only approximately at the top on the battle maps; the Persians are drawn at the top, facing the Macedonians.

7. Course of the battle (phases)

8. Key moments

1. Refusing the prepared ground. Instead of attacking straight into the levelled strip, Alexander moved right. The alternative, a frontal advance, would have given the chariots and the cavalry the fight Darius had prepared for.
2. Luring Bessus out. Alexander used his flank guard to keep the Persian left busy, drawing more and more cavalry away from the main line. Without this, there would have been no gap.
3. The wedge at the gap. Alexander held the Companions back until the gap appeared, then struck at once and at the Persian king himself. A charge earlier would have met a solid line; a charge later would have found the gap closed.
4. Darius leaves the field. Once the king fled, the army lost its centre of command. Had he held, the Persian wings, which were winning, might have closed round the Macedonians.
5. The second line. Alexander's reserve line, ordered to face about if surrounded (Arrian 3.12.1), stopped the raid on the camp from turning into an attack on the rear.

9. Tactics and strategy analysis

• Macedon: what worked. Alexander made the enemy move first. The angled advance and the flank guard stretched the Persian line until it opened. The combination of a solid infantry front (the anvil) with a heavy-cavalry strike (the hammer) put overwhelming force at one point, aimed at the enemy commander.
• Macedon: what failed. The breakthrough opened gaps in Alexander's own line as units advanced at different speeds. Persian horsemen got through to the camp, and the left wing nearly collapsed. Victory depended on Darius fleeing before the Persian wings could exploit Macedonian gaps.
• Persia: what worked. A sound plan on well-chosen ground; the cavalry on both wings fought well and Mazaeus came close to breaking Parmenion.
• Persia: what failed. The chariots were easily neutralised. Sending more and more cavalry out to the flank thinned the centre. Most of all, the army depended on one man: when Darius left, the army followed.
• Principles illustrated. Breakthrough at the decisive point; manoeuvre before combat; combined arms (hammer and anvil); targeting the enemy commander; a reserve to protect the rear.
• Counterfactual. Had Darius stayed on the field for another hour, Mazaeus might have broken the Macedonian left and the Persian cavalry could have closed on the rear of Alexander's wedge.
• The pairing with Cannae (B017). Gaugamela shows the breakthrough working: a thrust through the gap to the enemy's heart. Cannae shows its weakness. The Romans at Cannae packed their army deep to break through the centre; Hannibal let them push in, then closed on both flanks. A breakthrough succeeds when the enemy line is stretched and its command fails, as at Gaugamela. It becomes a trap when the enemy gives ground on purpose and keeps reserves to close behind, as at Cannae.

10. Aftermath and legacy

• Immediate. Babylon surrendered to Alexander, followed by Susa and Persepolis with the royal treasuries. Darius fled east and was murdered by Bessus in 330.
• Longer term. The Achaemenid Persian Empire, which had ruled from the Aegean to India for two centuries, ended. Alexander marched on to Central Asia and India, and the Hellenistic kingdoms that followed his death shaped the Near East for three centuries.
• How later commanders studied it. Gaugamela became the model for the decisive battle of manoeuvre: fix the enemy, stretch the line, and strike at the gap. Napoleon's attacks on an enemy centre, such as at Austerlitz (B080), follow the same idea.

11. Comparisons

• Pair with B017 Cannae: the breakthrough succeeds here; at Cannae it is turned into a trap.
• Same leader: B014 Hydaspes (Alexander against Porus and his elephants).
• Same principle (breakthrough at the centre): B080 Austerlitz; B111 Sedan 1940.
• Same enemy, earlier: B009 Marathon and B011 Salamis (the Greeks against Persia).

12. Sources and disputes

• Primary. Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander 3.7–15 (written in the 2nd century CE from the accounts of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, who served under Alexander); Diodorus Siculus 17.53–61; Quintus Curtius Rufus, History of Alexander 4.9–16; Plutarch, Alexander 31–33.
• Secondary. A. B. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire (1988); Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon (1974; revised 1991); E. W. Marsden, The Campaign of Gaugamela (1964); J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great (1958).
• Disputes.
  • Persian numbers. The ancient figures are far too high. This record gives them with a note and uses the modern range of about 50,000 to 100,000.
  • Macedonian losses. Arrian's figure of about 100 dead is probably too low; it may count only Companions.
  • Darius's flight. Arrian says Darius fled first; Diodorus and Curtius say his charioteer was killed and the army thought the king had fallen. This record follows Arrian and notes the other version.
  • Parmenion. Callisthenes, cited by Plutarch (Alexander 33), was hostile to Parmenion (executed in 330 on Alexander's orders), so the charge of slowness may be unfair. This record treats him neutrally.
  • The site. Tel Gomel is the usual identification, but the field has not been located precisely.